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ended.x6 After certification, the employer expects a respite from his labor troubles
only to find that the minority has started a campaign to displace the majority as the
sole bargaining agency. Whatever the remedy that may be suggested7 for the plight
of the employer, it is submitted that interference by injunction on the part of the
district courts is unjustifiable. The National Labor Relations Act lends its sanction
to the dosed shop agreement between an employer and the majority of his employees. 8 Such contracts invariably lead to the discharge of those who refuse to
join the majority union.19 No ferminus ad quem is fixed for the duration of certified
majorityship, and no provisions, statutory or otherwise, have as yet appeared requiring unions to cast open the doors of membership to everyone.20 Hence if the means
of organization, persuasion, and education, be taken away from the minority by injunction, 2 majority groups may as a practical matter become self-perpetuating. The
universal desideratum of minorities is to become majorities; and it is one of the functions of a democracy to make this evolution possible.
Labor Law-Power of National Labor Relations Board To Invalidate Contracts
of Independent Union-[Federal].-The Consolidated Edison Company, upon withdrawing its support from its company dominated unions, immediately recognized the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, an American Federation of Labor
affiliate, whose membership was neglible, despite knowledge that the United, an
affiliate of the Committee for Industrial Organization was the only active labor organization among its employees. The company continued to favor the American
Federation of Labor by permitting its officers to utilize company facilities in the
ensuing organizational drive, by exerting pressure upon the employees to join the
locals or be discharged, and by permitting it to carry on activities on company time,
at the same time denying similar privileges to the rival union. This favoritism was
,6The Board has sanctioned this means of getting employees to petition for certification.
Matter of Bartlett & Snow Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 113 (1937). On the subject of employer's remedies
generally, see 38 Col. L. Rev.

1243, 1262

(1938).

A dictum in the instant case offers a possible solution of the problem. When the Board
has certified the proper unit for bargaining, and a minority decides to strike and picket for
recognition, the majority employees-it is said-may petition the Board to have the circuit
court of appeals issue an injunction against the rebellious group. This would constitute some
sort of supplementary process to help effectuate the Wagner Act's primary purpose of creating a peaceful atmosphere for collective bargaining; but this would necessarily entail creation
of an unfair labor practice among employees, since only orders to prevent unfair labor practices
are enforcible by the circuit courts under Section io(a) and (e) of the Wagner Act.
'7

" 49 Stat. 449, § 8 (3)(935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (3) (Supp. 1938).
09 See Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y. 1, 12 N.E. (2d) 547 (938).
2o See Miller v. Ruehl, i66 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) 394 (1938). Pennsylvania does have a
provision in its Labor Relations Act refusing to recognize any organization which discriminates
because of race, color, or creed, 43 Purdon's Penn. Stat. § 211.3 (Supp. 1938), but this is a
minimum requirement.
21 The Wisconsin Labor Relations Statute anticipated just such cases as have been dealt
with here. To the section retaining in labor the right to strike is appended "or to deprive any
party to a labor dispute as defined in this chapter and in the [anti-injunction] act of the rights,
benefits, and protection of the ....[anti-injunction] act. Wis. Stat. 1937, § 111.17.
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climaxed by the execution of a series of contracts between the American Federation
of Labor locals and the Company after the hearings before the National Labor Relations Board were under way, covering terms of employment for members. The Board
concluded that the contracts, even if applicable to members only-and especially so
if construed as exclusive bargaining agreements-were invalid and ordered the
company to cease giving effect to them and to post notices to that effect.' The circuit
court of appeals, admitting that the appropriateness of the invalidating clause "was
not so clear" enforced the order on the ground that it was not so unwarranted as to
necessitate reversal.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board was
without authority to require the companies to desist from giving effect to the American Federation of Labor contracts. ConsolidatedEdison Co. of New York v. National
LaborRelations Board.3
Confronted with the determination of the propriety of the Board's order invalidating contracts between an employer and an independent American Federation of Labor
union, the Court rendered an opinion sufficiently vague to entitle both parties to claim
victory.4 Although the majority held that the Board lacked authority in the instant
case to set aside the contracts, it is debatable whether it predicated its decision on the
Board's failure to comply with appropriate procedural forms, or on the fact that the
contracts, applicable only to members of the American Federation of Labor, thwarted
no policy of the Labor Relations Act, or finally on the absence of power to abrogate
any type of contract between an employer and an independent union. The scope of the
majority opinion will probably be judicially determined in the first instance when
the seventh circuit decides the Jefferson Electric case, 6 wherein the Board conformed
to the procedural amenities specified herein and abrogated a closed shop contract between an employer and an independent union favored by the company.
To re-establish a neutral atmosphere in which employees may properly "secure
the benefits of self-organization and collective bargaining through representatives of
their own choosing,"7 the Board is empowered to order the abandonment of unfair
labor practices. 8 Conduct of employers clearly recognized as unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Sec. 8(1)9 includes, espionage,o strikebreaking,"x discrediting
x 4 N.L.R.B. 71 (1937).
3 59 S. Ct. 20o6 (x938).

295 F. (2d) 390 (C.C.A. 2d 1938).
(Justices Butler and McReynolds denied the jurisdiction of the
Board on the ground that the operations of the company did not affect interstate commerce;

and Justices Black and Reed dissented from the modification of the Board's order invalidating
the contracts).
4See statements of Messrs. Green and Pressman in New York Times, p. 22 (Dec. 6, 1938).
See 147 Nation 6o6 (Dec. 10, 1938); 97 New Republic 157 (Dec. 14, 1938).
s The Court insisted that the union, being independent, was entitled to notice of the
Board's proposed abrogation of the contracts. P. 218.
6
In the matter of Jefferson Elec. & Radio Workers (July 14, 1938).
7N.L.R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267 (1938).
849 Stat. 454 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o (c) (Supp. 1938).
949 Stat. 452 (i935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (Supp. 1938). "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer (i) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Sec. 7."
xoN.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 3o U.S. 58, 75 (1937); N.L.R.B. v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 3oi U.S. 49, 54 (x937).
"xN.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, 94 F. (2d) 862 (C.C.A. 2d 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S.

576 (1938).
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the union,'1 exertion of economic pressure in the form of threats to close or move a
plant, s and the stirring of community prejudice so that food stores discontinued extending credit to employees engaged in union activities.4 The instant case, however,
presents the novel question as to whether a contract between an employer and a
favored independent union's constitutes an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
Sec. 8 (1),z6 and may be set aside by the Board by virtue of its power under Sec. io(c).
The Board, proceeding on the assumption that "for the employer to dictate the
choice of representatives of his employees would be to destroy self-organization and
freedom of selection"'7 which the Act guarantees, has invalidated dosed shop agreements between employers and independent unions. Thus In the vmatter of National
Electric Products Corp."8 the contract with the favored union climaxed a series of
other unfair labor practices. The company urged its employees to become members
of the American Federation of Labor local, threatened them with discharge if they
did not comply or joined the Committee for Industrial Organization; supervisory employees were allowed to solicit members on company time; and finally, all employees
were required to join the union or have deducted from their wages sums equivalent
to dues. In the matter of Lennox Shoe Co.x9 the employer permitted organizers of the
preferred union to address the employees at meetings on the company time, designated certain employees to solicit members for the favored organization and even requested local business men to decide what labor organization the employees should
join. In the matter of National Motor Bearing Co.,2° the employer closed the plant in
an effort to discourage union activity and on reopening refused to reinstate workers
unless they were affiliated with the favored local; and in the WatermanSteamship case,
the carrier denied passes for entry upon the premises to representatives of the Com- Inthe matter of Atlas Bag Co., I N.L.R.B. 292 (1936); In the matter of Wheeling Steel
Corp., i N.L.R.B. 699 (x936), aff'd 94 F. (2d) 1021 (C.C.A. 6th 1938).
13N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, 94 F. (2d) 862 (C.C.A. 2d x938); Ansin Shoe Mfg. Co.
i N.L.R.B. 929 (936); Anwelt Shoe Mfg. Co. i N.L.R.B. 939 (I936).
'4 N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, 94 F. (2d) 862 (1938); Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co.,
2 N.L.R.B. 125 (1936), aff'd 91 F. (2d) 2017 (C.C.A. 4 th 1937).
's Since the Supreme Court has held that the Board may disestablish a company dominated
union in N.L.R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 262, afortioritheir contracts
with employers can be prohibited as unfair labor practices and the Board may properly set
them aside, as was done in the following cases: In matter of Clinton Cotton Mills, i N.L.R.B.
97 (1935), aff'd 92 F. (2d) iooS (C.C.A. 4 th 1937); N.L.R.B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 96 F.
(2d) 193 (C.C.A. 9 th 2938); In matter of Atlanta Woolen Mills, i N.L.R.B. 316 (1936);
In matter of Stackpole Carbon Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 272 (1938); In matter of Hill Bus Co., 2
N.L.R.B. 781 (1937); In matter of Lion Shoe Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 829 (1937), but rev'd in 97 F.
(2d) 448 (C.C.A. 1st 1938). See also Wettach, Unfair Practices under the Wagner Act, 5 Law
and Contemp. Prob. 223, 235 (1938); 26 Calif. L. Rev. 66i (2938).
16 Although frequently classified as an aspect of the company dominated union problem,
dealt with in 8 (2), these contracts are technically a violation only of 8 (1). For discussion,
see 26 Calif. L. Rev. 6i, 624 (1938).
Section 8 (1)includes not only the more prevalent practices enumerated in the succeeding subdivisions, but other tactics used by employers to bar effective organization. See Sen.
Rep. No. 573, 74 Cong. ist Sess. (1935) and H. Rep. No. 2247 (1935).
17In matter of National Electric Products Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. 475, 499 (1937).
1$3 N.L.R.B. 475 (1937).
205 N.L.R.B. 409 (1938).
'94 N.L.R.B. 392 (1937).
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mittee for Industrial Organization affiliate but readily granted them to representatives
of the American Federation of Labor.The Board, in abrogating the contracts, viewed them not in isolation, but, with a
more realistic perspective, in their background of undisguised favoritism, threats
against joining a rival union, discriminatory discharges, and a host of other condemnable unfair practices.2 In that setting the contracts may very well be considered
as giving the union a preference likely to have a marked effect upon the affiliations of
the employees.
The action of the Board in the contract cases is consistent with its general policy
to eliminate all subtle and imperceptible influences, which may interfere with the
employees choice of representatives. Because of the frequently prevailing hostilities
between employer and employees, seemingly innocuous acts by the employer have
been interpreted as unfair labor practices. Thus an employer was ordered to desist
from making statements that he favored employee organizations and had "information" that a "vast majority" of the employees would prefer to be represented not by
an outside union.m3 Statements in a company magazine, stressing loyalty, confidence
and cooperation as the basis of the company's progress and the importance of individual merit, were construed as thinly veiled threats of discharge. The distribution
of a booklet enumerating among the duties of the employer that he must guard the
company against destructive forces from within and without and refuse to recognize
any individual or group not having the welfare of the company at heart,24 and the posting of a message embodying a gratuitous offer of legal advice and specifying that employees might form representation plans under the Act,25 were similarly condemned
as unfair labor practices.
The decision in the instant case appears in sharp contrast to this general approach
adopted by the Board. Although admitting obvious unfair labor practices,26 by a
curious selectivity of attention, the Court concluded that the mere execution of a
contract with an independent union cannot be construed as giving the union such a
preferable status as to influence the choice of unaffiliated employees.27 The Court also
suggested that the contracts with an independent union were consistent with the
policies of the Act, 8 since the independent union by hypothesis represented the free
choice of the employees. Such a position would indicate that the power of the Board
to abrogate contracts was limited only to those between employers and company
dominated unions, outlawed by Sec. 8(2)!29 This conclusion would in effect overrule
the Board's prior decisions and, in addition, enable the employer to favor a union
more amenable to his demands than its rival.
" 7 N.L.R.B. no. 33 (z938). For similar acts of intimidation and assertions of preference, see
In the matter of Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, 7 N.L.R.B. no. 23 (1938) and In the matter
of Zenite Metal Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 509 (1938).
"See notes 17-21 supra. 23In the matter of Federal Bearings Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 467 (1937).
241n
re Cincinnati Milling Co., 6 U.S. Law Week 245 (1938).
2SIn re Western Felt Works, 6 U.S. Law Week 5o8 (1938). This conduct must be distinguished from a mere expression of opinion which the statute cannot be interpreted to forbid,
without violating the First Amendment. See N.L.R.B. v. Union Pac. Stages, 99 F. (2d) 153,
,78 (C.C.A. 9 th i938).
8
2

id. at 219.
2"49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (2) (Supp. 1938).
26,59

S. Ct. 206, 217 (1938).

27

id. at

220.

